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INTRODUCTION
This Essay lays out a research agenda for federalism in the twenty-first
century. I recognize the hubris in this, so let me hasten to add that what follows
is a synthesis of hundreds of pages of law review articles.' I will give a bird's
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* Dean and Sol & Lillian Goldman Professor of Law, Yale Law School. Iam deeply indebted
to the Jorde Lecture Committee for inviting me to take part in this wonderful tradition. Thanks also to
my three astute commentators-Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Bob Cooter, and Ernie Young-as well as the
Brennan Center and Berkeley and NYU Law schools. What follows is a lightly footnoted, modestly
expanded version of the remarks I delivered during my lectures.
1. Parts of this essay are adapted from my earlier work. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, The
Supreme Court 2009 Term-Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2010)
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eye view of the terrain I've already mapped and then describe the path we should
take from here.
What I write is very much in the spirit of Justice William Brennan, whose
legacy is honored by these lectures. Like me, Justice Brennan was a nationalist
who believed that states could play a central role in our democracy, a "double
source" of protection. "Federalism," he wrote, "need not be a mean-spirited
doctrine that serves only to limit the scope of human liberty."2
Two great twentieth century debates over federal-state relations have
shaped how constitutional theory treats what the Court once called "Our
Federalism." 3 The first battle was over the legacy of the New Deal-call it
Federalism 1.0. The second concerned the civil rights movement-Federalism
2.0. Whether you are a nationalist or one of federalism's stalwarts, the
intellectual frames we now use to understand "Our Federalism" were largely
forged during those battles. In effect, they created the operating system that has
served as our interface between practice and theory. Each debate embedded a set
of shared assumptions into constitutional theory. Both sides share those
assumptions-hence the idea that constitutional theory has a common operating
system-though each camp places a quite different normative spin on them.
The problem is that our operating system is outdated. It no longer matches
on-the-ground realities, which means it can't help us negotiate the controversies
that matter today. In our tightly integrated system, the states and federal
government now regulate shoulder-to-shoulder. Sometimes they lean on one
another, and sometimes they deliberately jostle one another, but neither reigns
supreme. States are not sites where groups can shield themselves from national
policy, national politics, or national norms. Instead, they are the sites where
we battle over-and forge-national policy, national politics, and national
norms. National movements, be they red or blue, begin at the local and state level
and move their way up. National actors depend on states and localities to carry
out national policies, which means that they need buy-in from state and local
officials to get things done. Our Federalism, then, is not your father's federalism,
and it's certainly not your grandfather's federalism. And yet constitutional theory
is still geared around these past debates.
It's time for constitutional theorists of all stripes to catch up. We need an
intellectual frame for thinking about today's federalism, Federalism 3.0. That is
particularly true of my fellow nationalists, who inevitably point to these earlier
debates in defending their position. Nationalists pride themselves on taking a
[hereinafter Gerken, Foreword]; Heather K. Gerken, The Loyal Opposition, 123 YALE L.J. 1958 (2014);
Heather K. Gerken, Federalism and Nationalism: Timefor a Detente?, 59 ST. LOUis L. REv. 997 (2015)
[hereinafter Gerken, Ditente]; Heather K. Gerken, Windsor's Mad Genius: The Interlocking Gears of
Rights and Structure, 95 B.U. L. REV. 587 (2015).
2. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489,503 (1977).
3. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
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clear-eyed viewed of regulatory realities, often rebuking federalism's supporters
for not coming to grips with the changes brought on by the New Deal. But in fact
the nationalists are now the ones behind the times when it comes to the virtues
of state and local power. So, too, nationalists pride themselves on their solicitude
for racial minorities and dissenters; that's one of the main reasons they are
nationalists in the first place. In this day and age, however, they may have it
backwards.
Federalism's stalwarts must change as well. They are right to think that
states matter, but they rely on an increasingly archaic conception of state power.
Their conception neither fits today's realities nor enables them to offer a full-
throated defense of the roles state and localities actually play in a thriving
democracy. Thus, while nationalists reject a federalism that is long past,
federalism's stalwarts yearn for a federalism that we'll never see again. Our
focus should be on perfecting the system we have. Our Federalism offers a
robust, distinctively American strategy for ensuring our democracy thrives.
While far from perfect, it is both a workable solution and a working solution.
Much of my prior work has been devoted to debunking the myths that
emerged from these early debates. While I'll briefly canvas those debates here,
my focus is on the future-what should federalism policy and doctrine look like
in the twenty-first century? My arguments will feature none of the neatness and
clarity that have characterized these debates in the past, but-as you will see-
that's precisely my point.
Part I, which focuses on Federalism 1.0, describes the conception of state
power that emerged from the New Deal debates and explains why it no longer
holds. It then offers a concrete example of how constitutional theory and doctrine
would change if we updated our operating system, Federalism 3.0, to reflect how
state power functions in today's federalism.
Part II centers on Federalism 2.0. It analyzes the constitutional "settlement"
we reached regarding the relationship between democratic protections and
democratic institutions-between rights and structure-in the wake of the civil
rights movement. This Part then argues that we should resist rather than accept
the rights/structure divide and again suggests the ways in which existing doctrine
is better explained by a theory that recognizes federalism and rights not as
antithetical, but as interlocking gears moving us forward. Here again, Federalism
3.0 requires a new approach.
Part III turns to one last observation about Federalism 3.0, suggesting it is
time for a d6tente between those in the nationalist and federalism camps. Our
Federalism may not embody either side's dream, but it's not either side's
nightmare, either. Instead, today's federalism offers a reasonable compromise




FEDERALISM 1.0 AND THE NEW DEAL
Let me first describe what I call "Federalism 1.0"-the assumptions about
federal-state relations that were embedded into constitutional theory in the wake
of the New Deal-before turning to the ways doctrine and theory would change
if we were to update constitutional theory's operating system.
A. The New Deal "Deal"
During the first half of the twentieth century, the stubborn facts of
modernization shifted federalism debates away from the separate spheres
approach, which depicts states and the federal government as dual sovereigns
confined to their own regulatory empires. Indeed, sovereignty has been declared
"dead" so many times that one starts to believe in the doctrinal equivalent of
reincarnation.
The scholarly response to the death of sovereignty has been either to move
to the nationalist camp, all but erasing the states from constitutional discourse,
or to pivot from a sovereignty account of state power to an autonomy account.
Ironically, both positions reveal the persistence of the old sovereignty story.
That's because both sides share the same conception of how power works. Each
camp assumes that power means the ability to preside over one's own empire,
free from interference. A moment's thought should make clear that this isn't how
the world looks any more. And yet the picture I've just described continues to
animate much of constitutional doctrine and theory.
Let's start with the federalism camp. While most of federalism's stalwarts
have abandoned sovereignty for autonomy in describing the power states should
wield, the two are little different from one another.5 An autonomy account-
premised on the idea that states must have zones in which they can regulate
freely-is softer around the edges and does not demand formal judicial
protections, so it's more palatable to those who consider themselves au courant.
At bottom, however, both accounts rest on the same basic conception of state
power, one in which states preside over their own empire and regulate free from
federal interference. Even process federalism 6 -the idea put forward by
federalism's sensible center-rests on an autonomy account. Process federalists'
basic claim is that states have enough political and administrative muscle to
protect their ability to regulate free from federal interference. Process federalism
4. The tradition dates back at least to Edward S. Corwin, The Passing ofDual Federalism, 36
VA. L. REv. 1 (1950).
5. For a more in-depth analysis, see Gerken, Foreword, supra note 1, at 11-21.
6. Wechsler first put forward the theory, Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of
Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54
COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954), and Larry Kramer and Ernie Young perfected it. See, e.g., Larry D.
Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV.
215, 223 (2000); Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 53-
63 (2004); Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REv. 1349 (2001).
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is thus built on the assumption that federalism's end goal involves the states and
the federal government engaging in the governance equivalent of parallel play.
The nationalist response to the death of sovereignty has simply been to
endorse a sovereignty account of a different sort, one in which the national
sovereign trumps the state.7 Even students of the gloriously messy parts of
federalism display their sovereignty bent when they celebrate federal-state
interactions as "cooperative" and treat the principal-agent problem as a
drawback to be solved rather than a feature to be celebrated. The nationalist
understanding of power is thus markedly similar to that of the federalism camp,
save nationalists imagine the national government reigning supreme.
Note, then, that while the New Deal "deal" changed federalism theory, it
didn't change how either camp thinks about power. Instead, both camps simply
put different normative spins on a reality that both sides accept-the power of
the national government to regulate what were once traditionally understood to
be state domains. The nationalist camp celebrates that shift. The federalism camp
accepts it begrudgingly, urging us to leave some regulatory terrain to the states.
The key, however, is that each camp still assumes that whoever regulates
will reign supreme. That's precisely why these debates pit the values of
centralization against those associated with state autonomy. The camps' shared
assumption is that one or the other government will win out in the end, so the
only question that remains is which side you think should win out. Put
differently, each side assumes that whichever side wins out will be . .. sovereign.
The New Deal debate may have shifted our idea of where federal power begins
and ends, but it didn't change how we think about power itself.
The problem with both positions is that they are painfully difficult to square
with today's regulatory realities. 9 The evidence abounds in environmental law,' 0
7. See Gerken, Foreword, supra note 1, at 71-73.
8. See id. at 11-18.
9. See, e.g., ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN (2011); ROBERT A.
SCHAPIRo, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (2009);
Abbe R. Gluck, Essay, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation
ofFederal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534 (2011).
10. See, e.g., David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case Against
Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1796 (2008); William W. Buzbee,
Brownfields, Environmental Federalism, and Institutional Determinism, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y REV. 1, 1 (1997); William W. Buzbee, Interaction's Promise: Preemption Policy Shifis, Risk
Regulation, and Experimentalism Lessons, 57 EMORY L.J. 145, 154, 157 (2007); Ann E. Carlson,
Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1097 (2009); John P. Dwyer, The
Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REv. 1183 (1995); Kirsten H. Engel,
Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159 (2006);
Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570 (1996); Daniel C. Esty
& Damien Geradin, Regulatory Co-Opetition, in REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 30 (Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin eds., 2001);
Bradley C. Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, Complexity, and Dynamism, 21
VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189 (2002); Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2011).
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health care," telecommunications,12 and financial regulation.' 3 We see strong
evidence in areas thought to be largely in the state's control, including
education,' 4 crime,' 5 family law, 16 and even a place as unlikely as land use law.17
These days, neither the state nor the federal government presides over its own
empire. Instead, they govern shoulder-to-shoulder in a tight regulatory space,
sometimes leaning on one another and sometimes deliberately jostling each
other. When one moves, the other moves with it. Overlap and interdependence
are the rule, not the exception. The choice in federalism fights is almost never
between decentralization or centralization; it's almost always both/and.
While the assumptions undergirding Federalism 1.0 might match what
happens in a one-off Supreme Court case, they do not capture how the states and
federal government interact over time and across domains. We argue as if one
side or another will win out, when in fact neither side has had much success in
playing a regulatory trump card under Our Federalism. Instead, states and the
federal government are usually governing together in a regulatory space that is
constantly negotiated and contested. Federal-state relations look more like the
implementation of the Affordable Care Act (ACA),1 8 with its messy negotiations
between the Obama administration and the states, than the Court's one-off
decision in National Federation of Independent Businesses (NFIB).19 They are
better captured by the delicate negotiations between the Attorney General and
state officials limiting federal marijuana enforcement in Washington and
11. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, Federalism from Federal Statutes: Health Reform, Medicaid, and
the Old-Fashioned Federalists' Gamble, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1749 (2013); Theodore W. Ruger,
Health Policy Devolution and the Institutional Hydraulics of the Affordable Care Act, in THE HEALTH
CARE CASE: THE SuPREME COURT'S DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 359 (Nathaniel Persily et al.
eds., 2013); see also Nicole Huberfeld, With Liberty and Access for Some: The ACA's Disconnect for
Women's Health, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1357 (2013).
12. Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the Enforcement of
the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692 (2001).
13. Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863 (2006); Katherine Mason
Jones, Federalism and Concurrent Jurisdiction in Global Markets: Why A Combination ofNational and
State Antitrust Enforcement Is A Model for Effective Economic Regulation, 30 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
285 (2010).
14. Gerken, Ditente, supra note 1, at 1014-18.
15. Id at 1012-14.
16. Id at 1018-21.
17. See Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Land Law Federalism, 61 EMORY L.J. 1397 (2012); Ashira
Pelman Ostrow & Patricia E. Salkin, Cooperative Federalism and Wind: A New Framework for
Achieving Sustainability, 37 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1049 (2009).
18. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken & Ted Ruger, Real State Power Means Getting in the
Obamacare Game, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 2, 2013), https://hbr.org/2013/04/real-state-power-means-
getting [https://permancc/R696-43B7].
19. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
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Colorado 20 than they are by the Court's decision on the reach of federal
regulatory power in Gonzalez v. Raich.2 1
Unfortunately, neither camp's account is well adapted to that regulatory
truth. On the pro-federalism side, both the sovereignty and autonomy account
depend on open regulatory space for the states to govern freely. The trouble is
that there's not much of it left anymore. National regulations have washed
across virtually all of the states' shorelines.
This does not mean (as a conventional nationalist would have it) that the
states are now irrelevant. Nor does it mean (as federalism's stalwarts might fear)
that states have been swamped by the tides of federal power. In fact, contrary to
the assumptions undergirding Federalism 1.0, the federal government doesn't
exercise unencumbered sway when it regulates any more than the states wield
unfettered power when they do. During much of the twentieth century, federal
law washed over much of the states' regulatory terrain, just as the nationalists
insisted it should and federalism's fans feared it would. But contrary to the
working assumptions of the New Deal debate-embodied in the term
federalization-as the federal government moved into states' domains, it didn't
displace them. Instead, the federal government consistently found it easier to
enlist the states' existing administrative apparatuses in the federal project than to
build its own from scratch. Health care is but the latest instance, but we see
examples in such varied domains as the environment (the Clean Air Act, the
Clean Water Act, CERCLA), labor regulation (OSHA, unemployment
insurance), children's health (the Child and Adult Care Food Program, the
Children's Health Insurance Program), transportation (the National Highway
System), telecommunications (Telecommunications Act of 1996), even voting
(Help America Vote Act). Cooperative federalism and joint regulation dominate
our administrative scheme, and states often wield substantial power within these
regulatory structures.
State power, in effect, exhibits a hydraulic quality. Even as federal officials
enter state domains, state officials find ways to assert their power informally
through networks, administrative and political ties, and the leverage provided by
the federal government's heavy dependence on state and local apparatuses.
Those channels of influence are less legible to lawyers but no less important to
policymakers. These relationships aren't captured by one-off judicial decisions
or even the one-time passage of legislation, but by the quotidian workings of the
administrative state.
20. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Executive Federalism Comes to America, 102 VA. L. REV. 953,
979-82 (2016); Erwin Chemerinsky et al., Cooperative Federalism and Marituana Regulation, 62
UCLA L. REv. 74, 85-90 (2015); Sam Kamin, The Battle of the Bulge: The Surprising Last Stand
Against State Marijuana Legalization, 45 PUBLIUS 427, 429-34 (2015); Rosalie Winn, Note, Hazy
Future: The Impact ofFederal and State Legal Dissonance on Marijuana Businesses, 53 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 215, 222-25 (2016).
21. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
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Moreover, just as the federal government regularly treads on traditional
state domains, the states consistently encroach on federal turf. Cristina
Rodriguez's work on immigration federalism gives the lie to the notion of federal
exclusivity.22 Benjamin Sachs's analysis of the role local and state officials play
in labor law makes clear that, despite the clear dictates of the National Labor
Relations Act and the exceedingly broad preemption doctrine, labor law does not
lie solely within the federal government's province. 23 Robert Ahdieh has
described what he terms "dialectical regulation" between federal and state
officials in the area of securities regulation.24 Scholars have even claimed that
states and localities play a robust role in national security regulation,25 foreign
policy, 26 and patent law.27 All of this work looks past the case law on exclusivity,
preemption, and the allocation of authority-the lawyers' traditional sources of
information-to examine what's actually taking place on the ground.
To be sure, as a formal matter, the national government reigns supreme, but
as a practical matter it must overcome regulatory intransigence, resource
constraints, and inertia to vindicate its aims.28 That's why the federal
government's success almost always depends as much on politics as decrees.
While the feds hold the national supremacy trump card, they must be
circumspect about playing it. If an issue matters for national values, that fight
can be had, and it can be won. The states can be shoved aside or brought to heel
or bribed. But the federal government must work to do so. In a world of
regulatory overlap, resource constraints, and a heavy federal dependence on state
and local actors, the federal government's programs depend as much on politics
as law. Technically the federal government can preside over its own empire, but
practically it relies heavily on the states and thus takes on all of the fractiousness
and messiness associated with that reliance. As Jason Weinstein-Tull has
quipped, the Supremacy Clause trump card turns out to be a jack.29
22. Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance ofthe Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH.
L. REV. 567 (2008).
23. Benjamin I. Sachs, Despite Preemption: Making Labor Law in Cities and States, 124 HARV.
L. REV. 1153 (2011).
24. Ahdieh, supra note 13, at 868 (2006).
25. Samuel J. Rascoff, The Law of Homegrown (Counter)Terrorism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1715,
1719-20 (2010); Matthew C. Waxrnan, National Security Federalism in the Age of Terror, 64 STAN. L.
REV. 289 (2012).
26. See, e.g., Judith Resnik et al., Kyoto at the Local Level: Federalism and Translocal
Organizations of Government Actors (TOGAS), 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10768 (2010).
27. See, e.g., Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Trolls and Preemption, 101 VA. L. REV. 1579 (2015);
Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Law Federalism, 2014 Wis. L. REV. 11 (2014).
28. For an in-depth analysis, see Gerken, Detente, supra note 1.
29. Jason Weinstein-Tull, Abdication and Federalism, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 889 (2017).
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B. Toward a New Process Federalism
What would happen if we updated our understanding of power embedded
in the New Deal "deal"? How would theory and doctrine change if we moved
past the assumptions of Federalism 1.0?30
At the very least, an updated account of federalism would force us to
rethink our account of the role judges play in policing state-federal tussles.
Process federalism-the idea that states have enough political and administrative
muscle to protect their ability to regulate free from federal interference-has
absolutely dominated the field for decades, and with good reasons. But it now
rests on an outdated set of assumptions about the nature of state power and fails
to capture how the states and federal government interact. It makes perfect sense
to look primarily to politics to safeguard healthy federal-state relations and to
focus on the second-order policing of federal-state bargaining31 rather than the
first-order policing of federal-state boundaries. But process federalists' core
argument is that states will leverage their connections to federal officials in order
to protect state autonomy. Process federalists' assumption, as I noted above, is
that federalism's end goal is for the states and federal governments to be engaged
in the governance equivalent of parallel play.
You can see Federalism 1.0's vestigial remains embedded in this argument.
Anyone positing state autonomy as federalism's end goal is pursuing a
conception of state power that is quickly becoming beside the point in our highly
integrated regime. If you want further evidence of how strong a pull the New
Deal continues to exercise on our collective imagination, just think for a moment
about the mechanics that process federalists have identified to preserve this
increasingly archaic form of state power. The basic idea is that states will use
their political and administrative ties to the federal government in order to
regulate independently. Process federalism thus rests, as Jessica Bulman-Pozen
has noted, on the contradictory assumption that federal-state "integration ...
yields separation." 32 Bulman-Pozen observed that it's odd that process
federalists never anticipated the possibility that "integration [would] yield
integration." 33
Process federalism begins, then, with the correct insight-that political and
administrative integration can preserve a robust role for the states in "Our
Federalism." But they are wrong about what that robust role looks like. State
power comes from integration and reliance, not separation and autonomy. I've
30. This Section adapts and expands upon an argument made in Gerken, Detente, supra note 1,
at 1027-32.
31. Erin Ryan frames it differently, but I take her project to be aimed at figuring out whether
and how we should regulate state-federal negotiations. See, e.g., RYAN, supra note 9; Ryan, supra note
10.
32. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, From Sovereignty and Process to Administration and Politics: The
Afterlife ofAmerican Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1920, 1922 (2014).
33. Id. at 1922. This work builds on the scholarship of Rick Hills, who has explored the
relationship between state and federal actors in intricate detail.
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termed this form of state authority the "power of the servant" to emphasize that
it stems from what amounts to a principal-agent relationship.3 4 That is a
deliberately provocative term, deployed in the hope that federalism's stalwarts
will shake loose the foolish notion that the states cannot be powerful unless they
are presiding over their own empires. While the word servant is directed at those
in the federalism camp, nationalists should pay attention to the word power.
Conventional nationalists are all too comfortable with the idea of the national
government serving as the principal to state agents. That attitude is perfectly
captured by the moniker "cooperative federalism." As the term suggests,
nationalists forget just how powerful a servant can be. As Jessica Bulman-Pozen
and I have argued, federalism can be uncooperative as well as cooperative.35
In some senses, it's odd that Federalism 1.0 has taken so long to adapt to
today's regulatory realities. You would think that fans of state authority, at least,
wouldn't neglect the power that states wield in the cooperative federal regime.
After all, entire fields-administrative law, corporate law-worry incessantly
about how much power the agent wields against the principal. But until quite
recently, those who placed faith in the states didn't imagine the power of the
servant as a form of power in the first place.
Going forward, process federalism should focus not on the power of the
sovereign, but the power of the servant. Our goal should be preserving the correct
conditions for federal-state bargaining over the role they play inside the system,
not trying to preserve the meager role they play outside of it.36
You might think that federal dependence on state and local officials is
sufficiently pronounced that courts can pull up the stakes and withdraw from
federalism cases entirely. I'm skeptical, precisely because the states and federal
government are so deeply intertwined. Federal-state tussles are inevitable. As
Abbe Gluck's work makes clear,37 the states and federal government have
become so deeply imbricated that courts must have "rules of engagement" just
to carry out their quotidian duties.38 We can't expect the judiciary to stop
refereeing this game, but we can hope that it will better understand how the game
is played.
I thus assume that the "new" process federalism is going to look more like
Rick Hills'39 or Ernie Young's preferred variant,40 where courts aren't policing
34. Heather K. Gerken, Of Sovereigns and Servants, 115 YALE L.J. 2633 (2006); see also
Gerken, Foreword, supra note 1, at 11-21, 35-43.
35. Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J.
1256 (2009).
36. Some of the most important work on this comes from Erin Ryan. See RYAN, supra note 9;
Ryan, supra note 10.
37. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism, supra note 9.
38. Id.
39. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State
Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813 (1998).
40. Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, supra note 6.
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state-federal boundaries but playing an Elyian role41 in ensuring that the right
conditions of federal-state bargaining are obtained. But the new process
federalists must discard the idea that dominates most of their work-that the
point of process federalism is to safeguard state autonomy.
C. The New Process Federalism in Practice
Just to ground this discussion a bit, let me describe what this might look
like in practice. I suspect that many federal-state tussles will be worked out under
the umbrella of a given administrative scheme, just as Gillian Metzger and others
have suggested.42 That would push vertical federalism to look more like
horizontal federalism, the allocation of power among the coequal states. Within
horizontal federalism, intergovernmental conflict tends to be resolved within
doctrinal silos (the Dormant Commerce Clause, personal jurisdiction, the Full
Faith and Credit Clause) rather than as a matter of constitutional theory writ
large.4 3
There may be good reason to celebrate this shift from constitutional law to
administrative law when it comes to process federalism. After all, if the goal is
to preserve healthy state-federal relations, the need for judicial intervention will
vary dramatically from context to context. In some arenas, the state will have a
great deal of leverage by virtue of tradition or federal dependence on its
administrative apparatus or whatever factors are at play. In other arenas, though,
the states may need a boost.
Until now, the Court hasn't engaged in this sort of calibration in the context
of vertical federalism. That's because in vertical federalism cases, the Justices
have long asked the same question in every case-how should we think of
federal-state relations writ large?-and unsurprisingly get the same answer in
virtually every case." Commandeering doctrine, for instance, has been applied
when the federal government has roped in understaffed local sheriffs to enforce
gun laws 45 and when the states themselves have called upon Congress to help
them deal with the shared problem of nuclear waste disposal.46
41. The frame comes from Ernie Young. Id. at 1395.
42. Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DuKE L.J. 2023, 2089
(2008); Gillian E. Metzger, States as NationalAgents, 59 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1071 (2015); see, e.g., Brian
Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law's Federalism: Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at
the Edge ofFederal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933 (2008); Stuart Minor Benjamin & Nina A. Mendelson,
Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REv. 737 (2004); Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism
Accountability: "Agency-Forcing" Measures, 58 DUKE L.J. 2125 (2009); Ernest A. Young, Tennis with
the Net Down: Administrative Federalism Without Congress, 57 DUKE L.J. 2111 (2008).
43. Heather K. Gerken, The Taft Lecture: Living Under Someone Else's Law, 84 U. CIN. L.
REv. 377, 378 (2016).
44. Id. at 383.
45. See Priniz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
46. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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Horizontal federalism, in sharp contrast, resolves interstate tussles issue by
issue, problem by problem, domain by domain.4 7 Rather than focusing on a
single big question, it evaluates interstate relations in a given context,
emphasizing facts on the ground and a myriad of doctrinal questions writ small.
An administrative focus is likely to push vertical federalism toward
horizontal federalism's more variegated model. It will be more domain-centered
and thus more attentive to context than the typical constitutional law case.
Moreover, as Metzger astutely observed, administrative law's "nonconstitutional
and generic character" may be "particularly well suited for addressing the central
challenge of contemporary federalism: ensuring the continued relevance of states
as regulatory entities in contexts marked by concurrent federal-state authority
and an extensive national administrative state. "48
As to the inevitable constitutional challenges that will arise, it's tricky to
find much that looks like a new process theory in the Court's current doctrine.
The Court, after all, isn't even enamored of the old process theory, as it remains
tied to the out-of-date sovereignty paradigm. The Commerce Clause cases are
nonstarters. These cases define federal power entirely in isolation.49 Because
they attempt to identify limits through sheer force of logic, the doctrine they
generate amounts to little more than logic games, which can be played by both
sides of any issue. This doctrine is unlikely to endure, and there will be little
reason to mourn its passing. Moreover, even if the doctrine were more coherent,
the point of the new process federalism isn't to stop federal power from
encroaching on state terrain but to facilitate healthy interactions on shared
terrain.
The cases that mark where Congress's power ends by identifying where
state power begins (the commandeering cases, for instance) are a bit more
helpful.o It's useful that they define state power in what I've called "relational
terms."51 That should be the core insight of the new process theory, after all. But
these cases are tainted by the same obsession with preserving autonomous zones
of state power as the Commerce Clause cases. While the Court is correct to
define federal power in relational terms, it's missed how that relationship
actually works. The core problem with the Court's nominally relational account
of federal power is that it's not sufficiently relational. It fails to capture the
deeply integrated, highly interactive relationship that exists between the states
and federal government in so many regulatory arenas.52
47. Gerken, The Taft Lecture, supra note 43.
48. Metzger, The New Federalism, supra note 42, at 2089-90.
49. For an in-depth exploration, see Heather K. Gerken, Slipping the Bonds ofFederalism, 128
HARV. L. REv. 85 (2014).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 96-97, 98-100, 101-19.
52. Still, one could imagine recasting some of this doctrine in relational terms. Think, for
instance, of Rick Hills' and Emie Young's recasting of the anti-commandeering rule-premised on a
conventional sovereignty account-into a rule that gives states an important bargaining chip in
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Perhaps that's why the closest example of the new process federalism
comes from a case that deals with cooperative federalism: NFIB's much-
maligned Spending Clause ruling.53 For all its many demerits, it represents an
effort by the Court to come to grips with the reality of ongoing state-federal
relations and to set some rules about how they should unfold over time. In a
rudimentary way, it asks the right question: Was the bargaining process fair?
And whatever you think of the Court's conclusion on that question, its decision
rests upon a simple, intuitive premise: the federal government can't pull the rug
out from underneath the states by threatening to cut off substantial portions of
their budgets for failure to comply.
There are other reasons the NFIB decision may be a harbinger for the new
process federalism. First, it's tailored to context. To be sure, the Justices still
disagreed rather vehemently about the context.54 But rather than trying to
evaluate state-federal relations writ large, both sides were asking whether, in the
context of this administrative scheme, state-federal bargaining had been fair.
There are many reasons to question the Court's effort to compare the legislation
to a contract or to focus its inquiry on whether the regulatory change brought
about by the ACA was fundamental or not. But at least the Court was trying to
work out whether the state officials had adequate notice and could enter the deal
with their eyes wide open. More importantly, it was paying attention to the fact
that this relationship was built against a backdrop of a decades-long partnership.
If we imagine NFIB as a harbinger of the new process federalism, we can
also identify shortcomings of the case that weren't canvassed by law professors
deploying the conventional assumptions of constitutional theory. For instance,
NFIB offers at least a rudimentary understanding of how state-federal bargaining
works, but it assumed-incorrectly-that the bargaining process ended when
Congress passed the ACA. Once you recognize that state-federal relations as
ongoing and iterative, not one-off battles, then it's clear that the timeline must
be extended. Just think, for instance, how much has occurred in the wake of the
ACA's passage. States like Florida, New Jersey, and Arkansas took advantage
of what some have termed the "big waiver"" in order to cut deals that allowed
them to carry out the ACA's mandates in a fashion more to their liking. The
negotiations. Supra notes 39, 40. So, the clear statement rule enunciated in Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501
U.S. 452 (1991), makes perfect sense if you want to be sure that the states know precisely what they are
bargaining over.
53. For an intelligent discussion on the strengths and weaknesses of Chief Justice John Roberts'
effort to wrestle with this problem, see Gillian E. Metzger, To Tax, To Spend, To Regulate, 126 HARV.
L. REV. 83 (2012).
54. That's precisely why Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Chief Justice Roberts engaged in
such an intense debate about whether the ACA was a "new" program or simply an amendment to an
existing one. See Nat'lFed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2605-07 (2012) (Roberts, J.);
id. at 2634-39 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
55. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Federalism by Waiver After the Health Care Case, in THE
HEALTH CARE CASE, supra note 11, at 227-44; David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense ofBig
Waiver, 113 COLUM. L.REV. 265 (2013).
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Court need not predict the future, of course, but it should recognize that states
routinely flex their political muscle after legislation has been passed. There is a
great deal more play in the joints especially where, as here, the federal
government is heavily dependent on the states' administrative apparatus. In the
era of the "big waiver," federal-state bargaining must be examined ex post as
well as ex ante.
None of this will be easy. The new process federalism will necessarily
implicate multidimensional problems involving resource allocation, governance,
and politics. Federalism debates were hard enough when we imagined federalism
battles as one-off problems involving a small number of institutional actors and
the causal arrows pointed in only one direction. But the new process federalists
must figure out how to take these complexities into account-especially the fact
that decentralization can serve nationalist ends-without losing sight of the core
problem. The questions the new process federalism will pose are hard, but at
least they are the right ones.
II.
FEDERALISM 2.0 AND THE CIViL RIGHTS ERA
Let me turn to the second debate that has shaped our understanding of
federalism: the debate over the legacy of the Civil Rights Era.5 6 Here too, I will
offer a concrete, doctrinal payoff to illustrate how our thinking would change if
we updated constitutional theory's shared operating system.
A. The Rights/Structure Divide
The Civil Rights Era was one of federalism's ugliest moments, with states'
rights routinely invoked to deprive individuals of their rights. Federalism 2.0
thus grew out of the intuition that, as William Riker put it, "if ... one
disapproves of racism, one should disapprove of federalism."57 Unsurprisingly
given the treatment of civil rights protestors, religious minorities, and other
dissenters in the Deep South, racism isn't the only "ism" linked to federalism
and localism. We also associate these institutional arrangements with other
dreaded "-isms," like parochialism and cronyism. And thus Federalism 2.0 was
born.
The nationalist tropes associated with Federalism 2.0 are reasonably
straightforward. While nationalists gripe about courts' failure to fulfill the
promise of the civil rights amendments, they still believe in rights. They'd just
prefer the Warren Court vindicating them to the Roberts Court watering them
down. And while some occasionally offer atmospheric paeans to the values of
56. Portions of this Part are adapted from and expanded upon in Gerken, Loyal Opposition,
supra note 1, and Heather K Gerken, Second-Order Diversity: An Exploration of Decentralization's
Egalitarian Possibilities (Yale Law Sch. Pub. Law Reseach Paper No. 591, 2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid=2868032 [https://perma.cc/D5LR-GCHE].
57. WILLIAM H. RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE 155 (1964).
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local participation, most nationalists are deeply skeptical of states and localities
when it comes to the groups that they most want to protect: dissenters and racial
minorities. It's not just that federalism calls to mind the Alabamas of the past
and the Fergusons of the present. People are also skeptical as to whether the
equality project should ever be left in the hands of democracy, let alone local
democracy. It is precisely to combat the evils of decentralization that equality
scholars emphasize the need for nationally enforced constitutional rights in the
first place.ss While this conversation has largely centered on race and the legacy
of the civil rights movement, I take it to be part of a larger nationalist fear-that
states facilitate a retreat from national norms.
The response from federalism's champions has been tepid, to say the least.
They typically offer an apologetic sidebar on race and emphasize the need for a
floor of basic rights in any federal scheme, but otherwise they have little to say
about the relationship between federalism and race. As to the role that structure
plays in promoting dissent, most of federalism's supporters haven't found a
middle ground between the anodyne notion of states as laboratories of
democracy and the alarming idea of armed state rebellion. As with equality, a
rights framework remains the default for the federalism camp.
In sum, federalism's proponents have simply reified the nationalist
assumption that rights, not structure, are what matter for equality and dissent,
and most have accepted the notion that federalism and localism are properly cast
in opposition to the interests of racial and political minorities. They have thereby
further embedded the rights/structure divide into constitutional theory's
operating system. The rights/structure divide runs so deep that law professors
even organize classes and casebooks around them. If you want to study the
distribution of power, you study federalism and the separation of powers. If you
care about equality and dissent, you study the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
As a result, when constitutional theory turns to its grandest democratic projects,
it privileges rights over governance, courts over politics, participation over
power, outsiders over insiders, and minority rights over minority rule.
As with the shared assumptions undergirding Federalism 1.0, the intuitions
behind Federalism 2.0 are hard to square with modem realities. They rely on an
outdated view of decentralization and a wrongheaded understanding of how
equality norms work. As to the first, ours is no longer our father's federalism.
Today's federalism is sheared of sovereignty. For every limit the Court has
tried to impose on the national government, there is a ready workaround.5 9 The
58. Gerken, Second Order Diversity, supra note 56, manuscript at 8-11.
59. As I have detailed elsewhere, "Congress has a ready-made workaround to bypass the anti-
commandeering doctrine, it can usually write in ajurisdictional element to satisfy United States v. Lopez,
it can borrow a page from Justice O'Connor's 'drafting guide' to fit its regulations within the ambit of
Gonzalez v. Raich, it can turn to its taxing power when the Commerce Clause won't do, and it will
presumably have no trouble evading the dictates of NFB (unless the Court lends some oomph to its
Spending Clause ruling)." Gerken, Slipping the Bonds ofFederalism, supra note 49, at 90-91.
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nationalists have lost battles, to be sure-Shelby County60 being the most
heartbreaking defeat-but they are undoubtedly winning the war. Even Shelby
County is easily remedied as a constitutional matter; we simply lack the political
will to impose a constitutional solution. 61 That means that states cannot shield
their discrimination from national norms, as they did during the days of Jim
Crow, but they can help fuel the process by which those norms are constructed.
As to those who equate equality talk with "rights talk," 62 it is useful to
remember that rights are built, not born. As a legion of scholarship makes clear,
constitutional rights don't descend from on high. They are built through social
movements, which are essential to make norms stick and thereby convert the
rights guarantees that lawyers dismiss as "parchment barriers" 63 into robust
shields. And social movements are almost always built from the ground up,
moving through local and state sites before hitting the national stage. If I may
borrow an evocative phrase from Robert Cooter, in a decentralized system like
ours, where law is forged within communities, judges tend to "find law, rather
than make it.""
So, too, congressionally conferred rights do not, like Athena, spring fully
formed from the head of a god. They, too, require politicking. It would certainly
be easier if those who believed in equality norms didn't have to fight for them.
But there is a profound difference between calling for a national rights regime
and achieving one.
Note, then, that I am framing the conversation about decentralization quite
differently than most. Academics often unthinkingly blame decentralization for
shortfalls in our equality norms. This simplistic formulation ignores the fact that
the turn to decentralization is a sign of weakness in the norms themselves. We
adopt a decentralized solution only when our national norm is to tolerate
shortfalls. Rather than condemning federalism for weak national norms, we
should focus on whether federalism makes it easier or harder to change those
norms. We should focus, in short, on whether decentralization helps us get from
"here to there" with the equality project.65 It is a fiendishly complex inquiry
because local and national politics constitute each other. But it's the right inquiry
nonetheless.
60. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
61. There are any number of constitutionally viable solutions to revive Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, A Third Way for the Voting Rights Act: Section 5 and an Opt-
In Approach, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 708 (2006). Here again, what's stopping us isn't law, but politics.
62. 1 borrow the formulation from Mary Ann Glendon, MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK:
THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991).
63. The term was, of course, first coined by James Madison. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 305
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
64. Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to
Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1646 (1996).
65. For an analysis of why scholars should pay more attention to the "here to there" on the
context of reform, see HEATHER K. GERKEN, THE DEMOCRACY INDEX: WHY OUR ELECTION SYSTEM
is FAILING AND HOW TO Fix IT (2009).
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If you turn your focus from enunciating national norms to actually
bringing them about, it becomes clear that decentralization can both inhibit
progress and dramatically expand the leverage points for change. While national
norms are responsible for shortfalls in our equality regime, decentralization
surely makes it easier to tolerate these shortfalls. And embedding a weak national
norm through decentralization can make change harder going forward. That's
not because sovereignty poses a barrier to enforcing equality norms any more,
as noted above, but because institutional arrangements are sticky. Think, for
instance, about our collective decision to leave school funding or public housing
to state and local authorities-a decision that makes it more difficult to change
our policies going forward. Given the overlay of residential segregation and
economic inequality, decentralization can preserve, even compound, the deep
and persistent effects of discrimination, something that makes it that much harder
to pursue a centralized solution in the future.
These costs are quite familiar, and they would be enough to condemn
decentralization but for the fact that decentralization also plays a central role in
the creation of national norms. It is precisely because local and national politics
constitute one another that decentralization is as much a tool for change as it is a
tool for preservation. This complex pairing may irritate us, but it at least frames
the question correctly.
As I've written elsewhere,66 social movements have long depended heavily
on federal and local politics to change equality norms, using state and local
policymaking as an organizing tool, a rallying cry, a testing ground for their
ideas.
The most remarkable example in recent years has been the same-sex
marriage movement, but we see the same phenomenon with other core parts of
the equality project, including immigration reform, policing, sentencing, and the
living wage movement, just to name a few. Marriage equality-LGBTQ
equality-had always been an outlier position in the United States. Proponents
of equality correctly understood that rights, like families, are built, not born. As
an enormous amount of scholarship has shown,6 7 constitutional rights don't
descend from on high. They are built through social movements, which are
essential to make norms stick and thereby convert "parchment barriers" into
robust shields. 68 So advocates used their First Amendment rights to change how
we think about the LGBTQ community. They protested, they marched, they
wrote editorials and blog posts. All of that was important. But the moment when
66. Gerken, Loyal Opposition, supra note 1.
67. Many law professors have abandoned this formalist conception of rights and acknowledged
the crucial role that politics plays in forging robustly enforced rights regimes. The work on "democratic
constitutionalism" is extensive. For an excellent overview of these questions, see Daryl J. Levinson,
Rights and Votes, 121 YALE L.J. 1286 (2012).
68. For an exploration of how parchment barriers become constitutional commitments, see
Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 124
HARV. L. REv. 657 (2011).
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the ground really shifted in the debate came when marriage-equality advocates
were able to put their principles into practice as Massachusetts and San Francisco
began issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples. 69
There's a reason that this opportunity for "dissenting by deciding" 70
mattered so much. The First Amendment is rarely enough for social movements
to change how we think.7 1 The real problem for political outliers these days isn't
getting their message out; it's getting their message across. It is extremely hard
to do that with speech alone. I could make that point by discussing long-standing
political science literature on agenda setting, 7 2 but I can make it more simply
here by invoking our iconic image of a dissenter: someone standing on a
soapbox. Now ask yourself: What do you do when you see someone standing on
a soapbox? You walk on by. Radio silence is the tool of the powerful these
days-it is always safer to ignore dissenters than to engage with them. If you
want to change how we see the world, you need something more.
The structure of federalism and localism supplies something more:
different platforms and different forms of advocacy for would-be dissenters.73
By giving social movements a chance to "dissent by deciding"--converting
abstract appeals into concrete policies-decentralization confers a variety of
benefits on democracy's outliers that the First Amendment, standing alone,
cannot supply.
Elsewhere I've canvassed these many benefits, 74 so I'll only describe them
briefly here. The platform itself matters. Decisions made by state and local
governments are highly visible, as they typically gamer more publicity than
protests or blogs or editorials.
Decentralization also facilitates agenda setting.75 When those seeking
change put in place a real-life instantiation of their ideas, the majority can't
69. Here I mean to describe when the ground shifted in favor of same-sex marriage. Hawaii,
of course, really jumpstarted the debate when its Supreme Court threatened to make same-sex marriage
a reality there. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). That decision ignited the debate that led
Congress to pass DOMA in the first place. For an overview, see MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE
CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, BACKLASH, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 57-60
(2013).
70. Heather K Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745 (2005).
71. I develop this argument in greater detail in Gerken, Loyal Opposition, supra note 1, from
which the next few paragraphs are adapted.
72. FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER & BRYAN D. JONES, AGENDAS AND INSTABILITY IN
AMERICAN POLITICS, (2d ed. 2009); ROGER W. COBB & CHARLES D. ELDER, PARTICIPATION IN
AMERICAN POLITICS: THE DYNAMICS OF AGENDA-BUILDING (2d ed. 1983); JOHN W. KINGDON,
AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES (2d ed. 2003; WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM
AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY
OF SOCIAL CHOICE (1982).
73. See Gerken, Loyal Opposition, supra note 1, at 1977-82.
74. Id; see also Gerken, Foreword, supra note 1.
75. Agenda setting may be the most powerful tool minorities wield in a majoritarian system.




ignore them, as majorities are wont to do. Decentralization thus helps social
movements shift the burden of inertia and force the majority to engage.76
"Dissenting by deciding" also gives dissenters a chance to move from the
abstract to the concrete. They don't have to talk about how a policy would work
in theory. They can show how it does work in practice. Better yet, it allows
advocates of change to build their movement one step a time. It is hard to
jumpstart a national movement. That's why virtually every national movement
began as a local one.7 Equality movements of all sorts began small and grew
into something bigger. And precisely because the federal government depends
so heavily on states to carry out its policies, states can exercise unexpected sway
over national policymaking as well.
In sum, while rights and structure have long been cast in opposition to one
another, in fact rights and structure serve as interlocking gears in a disaggregated
democracy: the First Amendment and federalism working in tandem to move
debates forward. Debate leads to policy, which in turn provides a rallying point
for still more debate. Social movements include pragmatic insiders, forging
bargains from within, and principled outsiders, demanding more and better from
without.
The egalitarian benefits associated with decentralization are particularly
salient these days because of the inherent limits of rights frameworks. A rights
framework can guarantee the right to vote; it's much less helpful in raising voter
turnout. Constitutional rights do a better job of combatting state-mandated school
segregation than preventing the private choices that lead to residential
segregation. Courts can ensure vulnerable populations have a right to counsel but
they are less suited to monitoring prosecutorial discretion or police training. Our
rights tradition, at least, can deter the most obvious forms of employment
discrimination, but it cannot guarantee a robust minimum wage, and it's poorly
suited to beating back the effects of implicit bias or structural discrimination.
Many equality fights-including those to change social norms-are being waged
through our policymaking apparatus rather than our Constitution. Here again,
federalism and localism play an important role. National policy, after all, is a
giant gear to move. As with a clock, you need movement from lots of small,
interlocking gears to move a bigger one. For those committed, as I am, to a well-
enforced, national equality regime, it's useful to remember that decentralization
can beget centralization.
Unfortunately, both sides have overlooked the democratic possibilities
associated with today's federalism. Nationalists have a bad habit of conflating
"Our Federalism" with our father's federalism, when state sovereignty loomed
large. Given their emphasis on national politics and national norms, they have
76. For a fuller account, see Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, supra note 70, at 1763-65.
77. This idea may even undergird Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), the first gay-rights
victory at the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Dynamics of Democracy: Travel,
Premature Predation, and the Components ofPolitical Identity, 50 VAND. L. REv. 445, 452-55 (1997).
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trouble imagining any room for states and localities in shaping them. So, too,
those in the federalism camp describe federalism in Westphalian terms, with
states facilitating choice and experimentation precisely because they are enclaves
from federal norms. Indeed, those in the traditional federalism camp essentially
want to preserve space for states to regulate free from federal interference, which
again runs one into sovereignty's most troubling features-it prevents the federal
government from enforcing national norms. But when federalism is sheared of
sovereignty, federalism's signature vices can become plausible virtues. States
and localities don't shield people from national norms, but constitute sites for
constructing those norms. And the national government can police federalism's
worst excesses while taking advantage of its best features, including the benefits
it offers to racial minorities and dissenters. These facts ought to change our
calculation as to whether the decentralization game is worth the candle.
B. The Discursive Benefits ofStructure and the Political Process Cases
What would happen if we moved past Federalism 2.0? What if
constitutional theory updated its operating system and acknowledged what I've
called the "discursive benefits of structure"1 8-the many ways in which structure
serves the same ends as the First and Fourteenth Amendments? At the very least,
we can supply a more robust justification for a set of cases that scholars have
long struggled to explain: the political process cases.79
While academics have long accepted the rights/structure divide, the Court
has occasionally muddied the distinction through what some have called the
"political process" cases. The formula is virtually the same in every case. A
minority group succeeds in winning an egalitarian policy at one level of
governance, and the majority insists that such policies must be passed through a
different (and more challenging) part of the political hierarchy. In Washington v.
Seattle School District,"o for example, a school district adopted a bussing plan to
combat discrimination, only to have it invalidated by a statewide initiative
banning bussing. In Hunter v. Erickson,8 1 a city council enacted a fair housing
policy, only to be invalidated by an initiative requiring such policies to be
approved directly by the city's voters. In recent years, we've seen similar cases
play out with regard to LGBTQ equality. Romer v. Evans 82 concerned the
decision of Colorado voters to amend the Constitution to prevent cities like
Boulder and Denver from protecting members of the LGBTQ community from
discrimination based on sexual orientation. Windsor v. United States83 addressed
78. Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview, 123 YALE L.J. 1889,
1894 (2014).
79. For an important effort to rationalize these cases, see John C. Jeffries, Jr. & Daryl J.
Levinson, The Non-Retrogression Principle in Constitutional Law, 86 CALiF. L. REv. 1211 (1998).
80. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
81. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
82. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
83. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
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the same kind of question, except it was bumped up one level of governance,
with the federal government refusing to recognize same-sex marriages legalized
by the states.
These cases are a muddle, to say the least, and they contain at least two
challenging doctrinal puzzles. First, it's hard to figure out the nature of the claim
animating the Court's decision. At least Washington and Hunter concerned
discrimination against an acknowledged protected class. But in Romer and
Windsor, the Court invalidated the law without granting gays and lesbians
protected class status. Second, as Palmer v. Thompson84 makes clear, animus
alone is not enough to establish an equal protection violation. You still need to
identify an injury, and it's tough to do that in these cases. All of the policies
challenged were, at least in the eyes of the Court at the time, constitutional. The
Court wasn't willing to say that anti-bussing ordinances are illegal or that voters
can't reserve certain decisions about discrimination enforcement to themselves
or that local LGBTQ protections are constitutionally mandated or that the federal
government can't choose which marriages it's willing to recognize. That meant
that the "injury" stemmed solely from the decision to move these issues up the
governance hierarchy, thereby undermining the ability of minorities to lobby for
their preferred policies at the state or local level. The problem, as Justice Antonin
Scalia points out in his dissent to Romer, is that we routinely move policies up
the governance chain.85 If shifting something up a level of governance is an
injury, then routine questions involving state and federal preemption-even the
way we structure local, state, and federal governments-will always be suspect.
Most of the work on the subject has examined these cases through the lens
of equal protection and minority protection.86 If you take seriously the discursive
benefits of structure, however, you might well conclude that scholars have been
focusing on the wrong section of John Hart Ely's book. The better way to
understand these decisions is as efforts to "clear the channels of political
change."8 7 That idea not only captures what the courts were doing in each
instance, but helps us solve the two doctrinal puzzles these cases raise.
It's not hard to see that passing local ordinances to aid desegregation or
forbid discrimination constitute crucial parts of the process of bringing about
84. 403U.S.217(1971).
85. 517 U.S. at 639 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
86. Consider the efforts to rationalize Romer v. Evans. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, The Constitution
of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313 (1997); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Democracy, Kulturkampf and the
Apartheid of the Closet, 50 VAND. L. REV. 419 (1997); Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah
Principle, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 257 (1996); H. Jefferson Powell, The Lawfulness ofRomer v. Evans,
77 N.C. L. REV. 241 (1998); Mark Strasser, From Colorado to Alaska by Way ofCincinnati: On Romer,
Equality Foundation, and the Constitutionality ofReferenda, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 1193 (1999); Cass R.
Sunstein, Public Values, Private Interests, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 127
(1982).
87. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REviEw 105-35
(1980). This Section adapts and expands upon an argument made in Gerken, Windsor's Mad Genius,
supra note 1, at 588.
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change. As I noted earlier, social movements almost always build from the local
in the pursuit of national goals. Indeed, we see similar efforts today. The
marriage-equality movement is but the latest example of how equality debates
are pushed forward not just through speech, but through state and local
governance. New Haven's adoption of an "Elm City ID" led cities in eight
different states to create a government ID for all of its residents regardless of
their immigration status.8 8 That effort, in turn, made it possible for states like
California to do the same through driver's licenses. 89 The $15 minimum wage
movement has moved from cities to states in a similar fashion. Following
Baltimore's lead in the 1990s, 140 cities passed living-wage ordinances by
2009.90 Grassroots efforts continue among cities, and now two states-New
York and California-have followed their lead in the Fight for 15.91 So, too, the
movement to place body cameras on police officers has moved from cities to
eleven states92 and even has garnered the support of President Barack Obama
and his Department of Justice.9 3 Today, a host of issues salient to racial equality
are pushed through states and localities, and from university admissions to public
school districting, from police practices to the living wage, from environmental
justice to sentencing reform. States and localities, in short, are the channels of
political change and are thus every bit as important to those seeking change as
the right to free speech.
It might seem trickier to fit Windsor into this frame until you reflect for a
moment on the power states enjoy by virtue of their imbrication in federal
lawmaking. The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) reflected what was once the
national view, forged in the wake of Hawaii's threat to allow same-sex marriage
in 1996.94 But the brouhahas in the states over same-sex marriage signaled to the
88. Paul Bass, ID Idea Catches On, NEW HAVEN INDEP. (Aug. 15, 2007),
http://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/entry/id-idea-catches-on
[https://perma.cc/J74A-GRQ9].
89. Tatiana Sanchez, There's Been a Boom in Driver's Licenses Issued to Immigrants Here
Illegally, L.A. TIMiES (Feb. 8, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/local/califomia/la-me-0208-inmmigrant-
drivers-licenses-20160208-story.html [https://perma.cc/J8JR-BYHL].
90. LIVING WAGE RES. CTR. (2009), http://bitly/2btwj9K [https://perma.cc/HB2Q-W3QT].
91. See Daniel Victor, California Enacts $15 Minimum Wage, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/05/us/california-enacts-15-minimum-wage.html
[https://perma.cc/3DPT-YGZF]; Patrick McGeehan, New York's Path to $15 Minimum Wage: Uneven,
and Bumpy, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/02/nyregion/new-yorks-
path-to-15-minimum-wage-uneven-and-bumpy.html [https://perma.cc/PJZ5-TPQL].
92. See Nancy G. La Vigne et al., Police Body- Worn Cameras: Where Your State Stands, URB.
INST., http://apps.urban.org/features/body-camera [https://perma.cc/23ZH-LZNL].
93. Jennifer Epstein & Carrie Budoff Brown, Obama Considered Tip to Ferguson: White
House Decided Presidential Visit Would Be Too Disruptive, POLITICO (Dec. 1, 2014),
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/12/obama-ferguson-community-policing-1 13230
[https://perma.cc/FPX3-CYN5]; Press Release, Dept. of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Justice
Department Announces $20 Million in Funding to Support Body-Wom Camera Pilot Program (May 1,
2015), http://wwwjustice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-20-million-funding-support-body-
worn-camera-pilot-program [https://perma.cc/CZN7-M3BR].
94. KLARMAN, supra note 69, at 57-60.
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Court that the consensus was unraveling, as Justice Anthony Kennedy himself
acknowledged.95
The Court would surely have stepped in if the federal government had tried
to silence proponents of marriage equality during this period. In Windsor, it took
a similar stance on the structural side. The Court made sure that federal law
didn't inhibit the debate as it was running through the states, which Jessica
Bulman-Pozen described as the staging grounds of national politicking. 96 By
lifting DOMA's restrictions, Justice Kennedy enabled proponents of marriage
equality to take full advantage of the regulatory integration between the states
and the federal government. Before Windsor, when the states changed their
positions on same-sex marriage, the federal government didn't have to adjust.
After Windsor, when the states moved on marriage quality, they got to do what
the states do elsewhere in the marriage arena and tug the federal government
along with them. The Court made sure, in short, that proponents of same-sex
marriage could take advantage of the interlocking gears of rights and structure.
As with the other political process cases, it ensured that both of the interlocking
gears of our democracy-rights and structure-were free to move without
committing to them moving in a particular direction.
Note that characterizing these cases in this fashion helps us solve the two
major puzzles the cases generate. First, "clearing the channels of political
change" doesn't require the presence of a protected group, as does the other main
strand of Ely's work.97 It's perfectly plausible for the Court to deploy the same
reasoning in cases involving LGBTQ equality as it does in cases involving racial
equality.
Second, the injury in question is much easier to understand against the
backdrop of structure's discursive benefits. If these cases really involved a
classic equal protection framework-protecting discrete and insular minorities
from the majority's power-you would have to be able to identify a concrete
injury. None of these cases satisfies that requirement; they merely involved
overturning policies that the Court concedes weren't constitutionally mandated.
But if your focus is clearing the channels of political change, you don't have to
think that the policies in question were constitutionally mandated to believe an
injury took place. Instead, in each of these cases the majority took away a crucial
weapon in the fight for change. The injury looks more like a First Amendment
problem than an equal protection violation.
95. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689 (2013) (explaining that while "until recent
years, many citizens had not even considered the possibility that two persons of the same sex might
aspire to occupy the same status and dignity as that of a man and woman in lawful marriage," now
"came the beginnings of a new perspective, a new insight"); id. ("New York acted to enlarge the
definition of marriage to correct what its citizens and elected representatives perceived to be an injustice
that they had not earlier known or understood."); id. at 2693 (describing the "evolving understanding of
the meaning of equality").
96. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1119 (2014).
97. ELY, supra note 87, at 105.
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There are other benefits associated with classifying these cases in this
fashion. For instance, these cases provide an interesting window on the
democratic dimensions of rights protections. Think about the debate between
Justice Thurgood Marshall and the majority in Cleburne over whether the fact
that people with disabilities had won some political victories meant that they
shouldn't be classified as a protected class.98 Marshall recognized the deep
paradox embedded in the quest for protected class status: you have to have at
least some political power in order to be recognized as politically powerless. 99
Romer-where Justice Scalia raised just this issuel 0"-and Windsor fit neatly
with this story, and they indicate that the Court has a role in shepherding this
process in its early stages.
I don't want to suggest that recasting the political process cases in this
fashion converts them into manageable legal doctrine. The fusty doctrinalist in
me has always struggled with these cases, and my framework doesn't make them
any less challenging. After all, even if a court were able to identify when a
national consensus has started to fray, it would then have to make exquisitely
difficult judgments about whether the political process is working properly. It's
also hard to imagine what kind of limiting principles the Court would place on
these sorts of claims. The First Amendment, after all, can be invoked by anyone,
but governance would break down if everyone could bring political process
claims like these. But my interpretation has at least one substantial advantage
over other efforts to make sense of these cases: it requires us to recognize that
rights and structure-long thought to be inimical or at least orthogonal to one
another-are deeply and importantly connected to one another and to the central
projects of our democracy. They are interlocking gears, moving the projects of
discourse and equality forward.
III.
FEDERALISM 3.0: TIME FOR A DtTENTE?
Let me make one, final point about where federalism theory will go if we
abandon the mistaken assumptions of the New Deal (that state and national
power should be conceived of in sovereignty-like terms) and the civil rights
movement (that decentralization is properly cast in opposition to the interests of
dissenters and racial minorities). Here I will pull together the arguments I've
offered about federalism's regulatory dimensions, the subject of the New Deal
debates, and its democratic ones, the subject of the Civil Rights debates, in order
to paint a picture of federal-state relations that constitutional theory has yet to
fully absorb. All of these arguments suggest that it is time to dispense with the
camps that have been at the bedrock of constitutional theory for decades. That is
so for both analytic and normative reasons.
98. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,466-67 (1985).
99. Id.
100. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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A. The Relationship Between Means and Ends in Federalism Debates
Let me start with the analytic point. While federalism's stalwarts and
nationalists have long feuded about the merits of decentralization, they have
always agreed on one thing-the relationship between means and ends. Scholars
on both sides have all but universally assumed that devolution promotes state-
centered ends and centralization promotes nationalist ones. Indeed, each side has
fought passionately for devolution or centralization based on their faith in that
simple hypothesis.
That hypothesis is incorrect. Federalism 3.0 has undermined what everyone
takes to be the nondebatable part of the nationalism/federalism divide. That's
because devolution can serve nationalist aims.10 That's precisely why we've
seen the emergence of the nationalist school of federalism, of which I am a proud
founding member. For ease of exposition, I'll term these scholars the "new
nationalists," just to make clear that they are outside the traditional nationalist
camp.
So why does Federalism 3.0 further nationalist aims? I've canvassed these
arguments in detail in my other work, taking dozens of pages to summarize
hundreds of pages of research. 102 Here I'm going to try to do it in a few
paragraphs. At the highest level of generality, you can divide the reasons into
three categories: democratic, technocratic, and structural.
One of the primary reasons nationalists should care about states and
localities has to do with a distinctive set of democratic goods, which I've termed
"the discursive benefits of structure."103 Federalism and localism don't just
matter to racial minorities and dissenters as they push for change, as I described
earlier in this essay. These structural arrangements also help us accommodate
partisan competition 10 and tee up national debates.105 We aren't forced to debate
issues on an impossibly large national scale, but are rehearsing those battles on
a smaller scale in an iterative fashion and in a myriad of political contexts. Better
yet, we aren't having these fights just in the airy and abstract realm of political
speech, where ideologues and intellectual purity hold sway. We're also having
those fights through governance, where pragmatism dominates and
accommodation is necessary.
101. Some have tried to show the converse-that centralization can serve state-centered interests
by helping them overcome spillovers, take advantage of economies of scale, and the like. See, e.g.,
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, ENHANCING GOVERNMENT: FEDERALISM FOR THE 2 1ST CENTURY (2008);
David Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 51 DUKE L.J. 377 (2001); Robert D. Cooter
& Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory ofArticle I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L.
REv. 115 (2010).
102. See, e.g., Gerken, Ddtente, supra note 1; Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism, supra
note 79; Gerken, Foreword, supra note 1; Gerken, Loyal Opposition, supra note 1.
103. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism, supra note 78, at 1894.
104. Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, supra note 96.
105. Cristina M. Rodriguez, Negotiating Conflict Through Federalism: Institutional and Popular
Perspectives, 123 YALE L.J. 2094 (2014).
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But note that states are not, on this account, red and blue enclaves that allow
us to live and let live, separate and apart from one another. That's the
conventional account of why federalism serves democracy, and it rests on the
mistaken assumptions of the New Deal. Instead, these arguments depend on a
high level of political integration, on the use of state and local platforms to wage
the fight over national values and national politics.
Devolution also serves more technocratic aims for the new nationalists.1 06
Traditional federalism imagines states as laboratories of democracy, engaged in
local policymaking, separate and apart from the feds, in order to compete for our
hearts and minds.107
The new nationalists have moved past the tired laboratories of democracy
account in other ways, identifying the policymaking benefits associated with
devolution, including mutual leaming, iterative regulation, helpful redundancy,
and healthy competition. 0 8 All of these benefits stem from integration not
separation, from joint regulation not autonomy. I've even written that the
laboratories account is a myth, however-a vestige of Federalism 1.0's
attachment to sovereignty. For all intents and purposes, however, there aren't
fifty independent laboratories these days; there are two. 109 One is red, one is blue,
and they are composed of highly networked national interest groups running their
battles through any state (or local) system where they have political leverage.
Moreover, once one of these "experiments" takes root, it is typically widely
mimicked-copied with surprisingly little thought to local circumstances-by
states with similar leanings well before the final results are in. Again, this is a
benefit that derives from integration, not separation.
Finally, the states serve an important structural role in a thriving national
democracy. Federalism scholars have always argued that states help check
federal overreach and serve as bulwarks of liberty. But because they remain
attached to the sovereignty model, federalism scholars haven't found much of a
middle ground between the anodyne (states competing for the hearts and minds
of its citizens) and the alarming (armed rebellion). That's not the structural role
106. This work dates as far back to Robert M. Cover, The Uses ofJurisdictional Redundancy:
Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639 (1981), though it was made prominent
by Robert Schapiro and environmental law scholars like Bill Buzbee and Erin Ryan. See supra note 9
and accompanying text.
107. The progenitor is, of course, New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
108. Dynamic federalism, iterative federalism, polyphonic federalism, negotiated federalism,
relational federalism-all are terms designed to capture the ways in which state regulation improves
federal regulation, and vice versa. See sources cited supra note 9. The new nationalists have even offered
a friendly amendment to the laboratories argument, with Abbe Gluck showing that cooperative federal
regimes can be the best catalysts of local experimentation, Abbe R. Gluck, Our [National] Federalism,
123 YALE L.J. 1996 (2014), and Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Chas Tyler, and I exploring its political
dimensions. Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, supra note 96, at 1124-29; Heather IC Gerken &
Charles Tyler, The Myth ofthe Laboratories ofDemocracy (2014) (unpublished manuscript).
109. Gerken & Tyler, supra note 108.
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states play these days, however. Precisely because states regulate jointly with the
federal government in a fashion that the New Deal debates failed to contemplate,
the states can check the Fourth Branch, introducing dissent and debate inside the
administrative state. Cooperative federalism is paired with uncooperative
federalism.1 10 The fact that states are embedded in a federal regime also allows
them to play a crucial role in defending congressional prerogatives, checking
executive overreach, and safeguarding the separation of powers."' Here again,
these are decidedly nationalist concerns and decidedly in keeping with realities
undergirding Federalism 3.0.
All of this work shows that devolution can further both state-centered ends
and traditional nationalist ends. Once we recognize that the causal arrow goes
both ways, it becomes clear that it's time to dispense with camps. If the causal
arrow goes both ways, the question to centralize is always a complicated,
context-sensitive question even if you care only about national culture, national
politics, and national citizenship. So, too, the simple equation of federalism's
stalwarts-devolution furthers state-centered ends-isn't as linear as we have
thought.
A. A Shared Account ofFederalism's Ends?
But still, you might be thinking. Maybe we have to be more careful about
causal claims, but the real reason the two camps are divided is because they have
such different visions of federalism's ends. That brings me to the second reason
why we should abandon the camps. Federalism 3.0 is a different reality than
either side anticipated, but it's also a different reality than either camp feared.
And it's one that should provide ample grounds for compromise between the
camps going forward.
If you care about state power, the states are still powerful. While states can't
block the federal government from invading their turf, they are also licensed to
invade the federal terrain. They may not preside over their own empires, but they
hold sway over large swaths of the federal empire. That means that state and
local officials play an important role in shaping not just state law, but federal
law. They can engage in cooperative federalism and uncooperative federalism.
They aren't outsiders to the behemoth we call the Fourth Branch, but powerful
insiders on whom the federal government is often heavily dependent. States these
days may not look as powerful as they once did to law professors who focus
unduly on the formal exercise of jurisdiction and unthinkingly assume that
principal can always command the agent. But if you focus on conditions on the
ground you'll see that states retain their preeminent role. Real power comes not
110. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, supra note 35.
111. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation of Powers, 112
COLUM. L. REv. 459 (2012).
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just from formal legal authority, but from money and manpower, politics and
practice.
The state's democratic role is just as important as its regulatory one. To be
sure, states aren't independent mini-polities, resolving their own questions
entirely as they see fit. But they aren't just convenient polling places for national
debates, either. Instead, states are the front lines for national debates, the key
sites where we work out our disagreements before taking them to a national
stage. States aren't pushed aside by national politics; instead, theyfuel it.
If you care about national power and national politics, in contrast, it's
worth remembering that states retain this important role even as the courts have
permitted Congress to regulate with close to a free hand. Nationalists have never
begrudged efforts at decentralization provided that the national government gets
to make the call about when to decentralize. And in almost every instance
nowadays, the federal government gets to make that call.
To be sure, while the national government remains at the top of the
hierarchy, it presides over a Tocquevillian bureaucracy, not a Weberian one. As
a result, the national government must often spend political capital to get its way
even when the law poses no obstacle. If nationalists are unhappy with that state
of affairs, their quarrel isn't with our law; it's with our politics.
Moreover, balanced against those regulatory costs are the benefits we
accrue from structuring our national democracy in this fashion. States are not
separate and autonomous enclaves that facilitate a retreat from national norms
but are at the center of the fight over what our national norms should be. And
states serve important technocratic and structural benefits that are impossible to
reproduce in a fully centralized system.
Best of all, the compromise I'm describing is the federalism we actually
have: Our Federalism. To be sure, the question of how to "perfect" our existing
system might just reproduce the same debate over differing visions of
democracy. But that would require a pretty robust confidence that decisions to
devolve or centralize this or that program are going to effect a radical change in
our system, overcoming long-standing regulatory trends, cultural and media
forces and, most importantly, the tides of politics.
Again, the reality I've described isn't either side's ideal; but it's also neither
camp's nightmare. And it should provide a reasonably satisfying compromise
for debates going forward.
CONCLUSION
This observation returns me to my overarching theme: constitutional theory
is outdated. Embedded within federalism theory are a series of assumptions that
no longer describe Our Federalism, today 's federalism. Our regulatory structures
and politics are deeply intertwined. Neither the federal government nor the states
preside over their own empire; instead, they regulate shoulder-to-shoulder in a
tight regulatory space, sometimes leaning on one another and sometimes
[Vol. 105:16951722
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deliberately jostling each other. So, too, states are no longer enclaves that
facilitate retreats from national norms. Instead, they are the sites where those
norms are forged. And while local and state structures were once condemned
solely as tools for blocking racial change, they also provide crucial structures for
seeking change. None of these truths has been fully absorbed by constitutional
theory. It's time to update constitutional doctrine, to adapt constitutional theory
to the realities of Federalism 3.0. That should be federalism's research agenda
for the twenty-first century.
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